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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the determinants of accounting choices for subsidiary 
firms in multi-firm organizations. A “subsidiary” is defined as either a company that is 
controlled (i.e., more than 50 percent ownership) by another corporation (its “parent”) 
or is a firm under the parent company’s influence (i.e., between 20 and 50 percent 
ownership). Previous studies focus exclusively on the parent company; hence little is 
known about making accounting procedure choices for subsidiaries. As a separate 
legal entity, a subsidiary’s accounting policies should be o f interest to its creditors, 
regulators, and noncontrolling minority-interest shareholders.
The accounting procedure choices investigated are depreciation and inventory. 
The sample was comprised o f 96 subsidiary-parent matches for depreciation methods 
and 36 subsidiary-parent matches for inventory methods drawn from the period 
ranging from 1982 to 1997. Two sets of empirical models were evaluated. First, single 
firm models that ignore the nature o f the parent-subsidiary relationship but, rather, 
focus solely on the characteristics of the subsidiary firm. Second, multi-firm models 
were evaluated that expand the single firm model by including variables that capture 
certain aspects of the parent-subsidiary relationship. Statistically significant results 
were found for some o f the following variables that measure the multi-firm aspect of 
the subsidiary’s accounting choice: (1) the parent company’s choice, (2) the 
percentage ownership held by the parent, and (3) when the subsidiary was acquired 
from another parent company. In addition, this study contributes by identifying the 
level of proportional ownership that signals, on average, the exercise of parental 
influence over the subsidiary’s choice.
vi
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The purpose o f this study is to examine the accounting choices made by 
partially owned subsidiaries and unconsolidated subsidiaries in multi-firm 
organizations. Multi-firm organizations have at least two firms that are linked through 
ownership (i.e., a parent and subsidiary). While previous accounting choice studies 
focus on the parent company’s choice, I am restricting the analysis to the partially 
owned subsidiary firm’s accounting choice. A subsidiary firm is either a partially 
owned subsidiary or a firm under the parent company’s influence (i.e., 
unconsolidated).1
Because a subsidiary can contribute significantly to the financial results o f the 
multi-firm organization (e.g., American Airlines and its parent, AMR Corp.), a 
subsidiary’s accounting choices can affect the parent’s consolidated financial results. 
Moreover, since the study’s focus is on partially owned subsidiaries, understanding 
their accounting choices should be of interest to the subsidiary’s noncontrolling equity 
interest owners. The analysis is conducted using a sample o f partially owned 
subsidiaries (i.e., more than 20%, but less than 100% owned) between 1978 and 1997 
for which separate financial statements are available. Both consolidated and 
unconsolidated subsidiaries will be analyzed. The statistical analysis will be
1 Technically the terms “parent” and “subsidiary” refer to relationships where 
control by one entity (the parent) is exercised over the other (the subsidiary). When 
such control is nonexistent it may be more appropriate to use the terms “investor” and 
“investee.” For convenience, however, parent and subsidiary are used in practice and 
in accounting literature. I intend to follow this convention in this study.
1
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conducted in two stages. First, regressing the subsidiary’s accounting choice on a set 
o f explanatory variables peculiar to the single-firm organization, which I refer to as 
the single firm model (SFM) throughout the study. This test follows the format 
traditionally used in accounting choice studies. The second stage of analysis 
introduces variables that capture the nature of the parent-subsidiary relationship, 
referred to throughout the study as the multi-firm model (MFM). Figure I 
summarizes the general approach to the study, and Table 1 presents definitions for the 
items in Figure 1.
Is SFM 
adequate?
Subsidiary
Single-firm Multi-FirmSingle-firm
(SFM not adequate) 
Accounting Choice
(SFM is adequate) 
Accounting Choice
PAC
MAG
INDSPEC
INDSIM
%Own
Bonus
AIP
LEV
Cover
Size
ROA
Risk
CAP
REG
Bonus
AIP
LEV
Cover
Size
ROA
Risk
CAP
REG
Figure 1. Study of Accounting Choice for Subsidiary Firms
Subsidiary corporations may choose accounting methods that differ from those 
of their parent company for a variety o f reasons. The variables used in this study to
2
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help explain the subsidiary’s accounting choices are classified as either single-firm 
(SF) variables or multi-firm (MF) variables. The single-firm model (SFM) includes 
the following variables suggested by the extant literature that may affect a single-firm 
organization’s accounting choice: (1) the existence o f accounting-based bonus plans 
(Bonus), (2) the firm’s assets-in-place (AIP), (3) leverage (LEV),
Table 1
Legend of Accounting Choice Variables
j = j accounting policy choice,
ACJ Accounting choice is measured as 1, and 0 otherwise, if the 
firm’s j th choice is income increasing. The accounting policy 
choices to be examined are depreciation (straight-line =1), and 
Inventory (FIFO & Weighted Avg. = 1) zero otherwise,
Single-firm (SF) variables
Bonus Bonus for CEO that is dependent on accounting income is 
measured as 1 if it exists, 0 otherwise,
AIP Assets-in-place is measured by (total book value of assets - the 
book value of intangible assets) divided by size, 4-year 
average,
LEV Leverage is measured by long-term debt + assets, 4-year 
average,
Cover Interest coverage is the operating income before depreciation 
interest expense, 4-year average,
Size Size is measured by the market value of equity + the book 
value of debt, 4-year average,
ROA Performance is measured as the average return on assets, 4- 
year average,
Risk Risk or uncertainty is measured by the standard deviation of 
return on assets, 4-year average,
REG Regulation is measured as, 1 if parent or firm is regulated, 0 
otherwise,
CAP Consensus industry accounting policy choice after omitting the 
second-level firm’s choice, measured as, I when average >
60% and - Holthausen 1 when average <= 40%, 0 otherwise,
TLCF
=
Used in inventory choice model. 1 if tax-loss carry forward, 0 
otherwise,
INFL Used in inventory choice model. 1 if average inflation is 3% or 
more for previous five years, -1 if average deflation is 3% or 
more for previous five years, and 0 otherwise.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 1 Continued
Multi-firm (MF) variables
PAC — Parent’s choice, measured as 1 for incoming increasing and 0 
otherwise,
MAG Magnitude o f control costs is measured as, as the subsidiary 
operating income before depreciation the same income 
measure of the parent, 4-year average,
INDSPEC Industry knowledge specialization is measured by 1, and 0 
otherwise, if there is a difference in the four digit SIC group 
between the parent and the subsidiary and the coding of 
knowledge specialization at the subsidiary is identified by the 
classification of industries by Christie, Joye, and Watts (1998),
INDSIM Industry similarity between the parent and the subsidiary is 
measured as a 1 if  the parent’s primary 2 digit SIC group 
matches the subsidiary’s 2 digit SIC group, and 0 otherwise,
%Own Proportional ownership of the subsidiary by the parent, 
measured variously as over 1 when over 50%, 40%, 30%, and 
25% and also continuously in various models,
PREV Previous ownership, is measured as 1 when acquired 
subsidiary was previously owned by another parent prior to 
acquisition of current parent (data supplied by Securities Data 
Corporation),
AQUIR = Subsidiary acquired by parent is measured as 1, 0 otherwise.
PACREG = Interaction term, REG x PAC.
(4) Interest coverage (Cover), (5) size, (6) performance (ROA), (7) Risk, (8) industry 
consensus accounting procedure (CAP), and (9) regulation (REG).
Because the accounting choices under investigation are o f partially owned 
subsidiaries, various aspects and issues of the multi-firm organization also need to be 
considered. Multi-firm variables posited to affect the subsidiary’s accounting choice 
are the parent’s accounting choice (PAC), the magnitude of subsidiary related-control 
costs (MAG), industry specialization (INDSPEC), parent-subsidiary similarity 
(INDSIM), and the proportion of ownership that the parent has in the subsidiary 
(%Own). As a separate legal entity, a subsidiary’s accounting policies should be of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
interest to creditors and regulators and will certainly be o f  interest to the 
noncontrolling minority-interest shareholders.
The question that derives from the foregoing discussion is “what motivates 
some subsidiaries to align their accounting choices with those of the parent entity 
while others do not?” Hence, the primary research questions are
Does a single firm model of accounting choice for depreciation and 
inventory procedures work equally well for both subsidiary and parent 
companies? Can further explanatory power be obtained for the 
subsidiary’s procedural choices by including the salient aspects of the 
parent-subsidiary relationship in the accounting-choice model?
To address these questions, accounting choices for depreciation and inventory 
are investigated using a model derived from Skinner’s (1993) study o f accounting 
choice. These two accounting method choices are selected because, (1) they are 
typically associated with large effects on earnings (Pincus 1994, Christie and 
Zimmerman 1994), (2) they are choices available to today’s managers (unlike 
investment tax credits which were eliminated in the Tax Reform Act o f 1986), (3) the 
data for these analyses are available, and (4) previous parent-level studies have 
investigated the determinants of these procedural choices. Moreover, since these 
particular accounting procedure choices have been analyzed in earlier studies, the base 
single-firm model is well established such that the analysis can be directed at the 
incremental contribution of the multi-firm characteristics under study.
In summary, the primary contribution of this study to the accounting choice 
literature is the investigation the accounting choice of subsidiary firms in the multi-
5
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firm organization. Understanding the accounting procedure choice o f the subsidiary 
firm in a multi-firm organization is important because much o f the economic activity 
in large firms is conducted at the subsidiary level. If  the accounting choice literature 
addresses only issues that are specific to parent-level firms, multi-firm organization 
accounting choice may not be completely understood by investors, standard setters, 
educators, and regulators. In the remainder o f the paper, the following topics are 
discussed in the noted chapters: Background Literature and Theory (2), Research 
Hypotheses, Data and Methods (3), Empirical Test Results (4), and Summary and 
Conclusions (5).
6
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND LITERATURE AND THEORY
Positive accounting theory assumes that implied and explicit contracts generate 
demand for accounting numbers that the outcomes o f the contracts change with 
accounting numbers and that differences in contractual outcomes affect firm value 
(Christie 1990). Given the importance o f accounting method choices on accounting 
earnings, positive accounting studies have devoted a considerable amount o f attention 
toward understanding the rationale behind accounting choices made by firm managers. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of efficient contracting for the firm that results 
in value-maximizing behavior by the contracting parties when selecting an accounting 
procedure. Subsequently, the positive accounting literature is reviewed to develop a 
single firm model of accounting choice that serves as a base model for study. In 
chapter 3 the SFM is expanded to incorporate pertinent variables to specify the 
economics o f choosing a subsidiary’s accounting procedure in a multi-firm 
environment. The literature review focuses on prior studies o f discrete accounting 
choice for depreciation and inventory methods in order to lay the empirical 
groundwork for this study. Studies of discrete measures of and changes in accounting 
procedure choice are included because these studies provide the most direct evidence 
o f the determinants of discrete accounting procedure choice.
Efficient Contracting 
Efficient contracts minimize contracting costs within the organization. Watts 
and Zimmerman define contracting costs as follows:
7
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Contracting costs consist o f transaction costs (e.g., brokerage fees), 
agency costs (e.g., monitoring costs, bonding costs, and the residual 
loss from dysfunctional decisions), information costs (e.g., the costs o f 
becoming informed), renegotiation costs (e.g., the costs o f rewriting 
existing contracts because the extant contract is made obsolete by some 
unforeseen event), and bankruptcy costs (e.g., the legal costs of 
bankruptcy and the costs of dysfunctional decisions). (1990, 134)
Watts and Zimmerman (1986, 1990) posit that accounting choices are made to
maximize firm value in response to efficient compensation contracts that are designed
ex ante to minimize contracting costs in the organization. Managers are allowed
leeway in choosing accounting procedures because they are best informed as to which
procedures are efficient in maximizing value. Similarly, Demski, Patell, and Wolfson
(1984) argue that managers are best able to efficiently select accounting choices.
Skinner notes that:
if there are efficiency-based costs and benefits to particular accounting 
choices, managers are likely to best know which accounting procedure 
choices maximize the value o f the firm ... managers are likely to have 
the best information about which accounting procedures minimize the 
firm’s potential cost in the political/regulatory process, or about which 
accounting methods provide the best way of motivating employees 
(1993,411)
Smith and Watts (1982); Holthausen (1990); Christie and Zimmerman (1994); 
DeAngelo, and DeAngelo, and Skinner (1994) make similar arguments for efficient 
accounting method choices by management ex post o f managerial contracts. The 
efficient contracting argument is important to this study because it creates predictable 
demands for accounting procedure choice.
Previous L iterature 
Three accounting choice hypotheses are the primary focus o f previous 
literature on discrete accounting procedure choice. The three hypotheses are (1) the
8
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bonus plan, (2) debt, and (3) political cost hypotheses (Watts and Zimmerman 1986, 
1990). Tables 2, 3, and 4 summarize the previous literature on discrete accounting 
procedure choice. A fourth hypothesis, based on the accepted set, is also discussed in 
this section.
• Bonus Plan Hypothesis: The bonus plan hypothesis (Healy 1985) posits that 
managers choose income-increasing accounting methods to maximize accounting- 
based incentive compensation, ex post o f  execution of the management compensation 
contract. In a field-study of the achievability of annual profit center budget targets, 
Merchant and Manzoni (1989) infer from the data from fifty-four profit centers in 
twelve corporations that “budget targets are set to be achievable an average o f  eight or 
nine years out of ten” (539). This empirical evidence appears to significantly temper 
the potential for accounting-based bonus plans to have a significant income-increasing 
effect in the subsidiary firm.
As shown in Tables 2, 3, and 4, the bonus plan hypothesis is supported by 
empirical evidence in positive coefficients for income-increasing methods in 
Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) (depreciation), Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) (7 
strategy), and Skinner (1993) (depreciation and strategy). Some studies provide 
inconsistent evidence with the bonus plan hypothesis (Hagerman and Zmijewski 1979 
[inventory], Hunt 1985 [inventory], Press and Weintrop 1990 [strategy]). The 
inconsistent evidence for the bonus plan hypothesis is in insignificant coefficients 
(significance greater than 10%) and not from statistically significant income- 
decreasing coefficients.
9
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Table 2
Previous Regression Results of Discrete Depreciation Procedure Choice
The results are stated in terms of the sign on the coefficient and the 1-tailed significance level, except for assets-in-place (AIP), 
which is reported as a 2-tailed significance level.
Study Bonus AIP LEV Cover Size ROA Risk Source
Hagerman
and
Zmijewski
(1979)
+0.039 -0.016 -0.008 Table 5
Dhaliwal, 
Salamon 
and Smith 
(1982)
+0.002 -0.15 Table 5
Dhaliwal
(1988)
+0.011 — -0.049 — +0.025l+r 
+0.113S*R
Table 5
Niehaus
(1989)
“  “ —*• +0.021 “ “ -0.231 Table 7, 
Equation 1
Knoeber 
and McKee 
(1991)
-0.483 -0.039 Table 3, 
Model 2
Skinner
(1993)
+0.001 -0.271 +0.169 - 0.000 +0.115 -0.166 Table 7, 
Panel A, 
Regression 5
Christie and 
Zimmerman 
(1994)
+0.000 +0.218 - 0.000 +0.024 Table 3, 
Years 
-6 to -1
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Table 2 Continued
Study Bonus AIP LEV Cover Size ROA Risk Source
Bowen, 
DuCharme, 
& Shores 
(1995)
+0.226 +0.999 +0.059 +0.059L)-ROA Table 6, 
Panel C, 
Year 1993
L*R is the interaction between leverage and risk. S*R is the interaction between size and risk. D ROA is a dummy variable for 
the second through ninth rank deciles of industry ROA, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 3
Previous Regression Results of Discrete Inventory Procedure Choice
The results are stated in terms of the sign on the coefficient and the 1-tailed significance level, except for assets-in-place (AIP), 
which is reported as a 2-tailed significance level.
Study Bonus AIP LEV Cover Size ROA Risk Source
Hagerman
and
Zmijewski
(1979)
-0.463 -0.141 +0.063 Table 5
Hunt (1985) +0.439 “ “ +0.214 -0.064 — Table 9, 
Version 1
Lee and
Hsieh
(1985)
-0.148 +0.362 -0.032 Table 5, 
Analysis 6
Caster and
Simon
(1986)
+0.413 Table 1, 
Full Model
Niehaus
(1989)
—~ - - -0.216 — +0.933 — — Table 6, 
Equation 4
Lindahl
(1989)
—~ — +0.005 — -0.080 +0.31 Table 5
Cushing and
LeClere
(1992)
->10 _ * 01 Table 3, 
Model 3
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Table 3 Continued
Kuo (1993) — — +0.096 — - 0.000 — +0.143LK
+0.464s*r
Table 5, 
Equation 1
Skinner
(1993)
+0.341
"
- 0.000 +0.055 -0.492 Table 6, 
Regression 10
Christie and 
Zimmerman 
(1994)
+0.000 -0.448 - 0.000 -0.460 +0.000 Table 4, 
Years-6 to -1
Bowen, 
DuCharme, 
& Shores 
(1995)
-0.555 - 0.000 +0 . 437 d - r o a Table 5, 
Panel C, 
Year 1993
* >10 Reported significance is greater than 10%, * 01 Reported significance is less than or equal to 1%,
L*R is the interaction between leverage and risk. S*R is the interaction between size and risk. D_ROA is a dummy variable for 
the second through ninth rank deciles of industry ROA, and 0 otherwise.
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Table 4
Previous Regression Results of Discrete Strategies of Procedure Choice
The results are stated in terms of the sign on the coefficient and the 1-tailed significance level, except for assets-in-place (AIP), 
which is reported as a 2-tailed significance level.
Study Bonus AIP LEV Cover Size ROA Risk Source
Zmijewski
and
Hagerman
(1981)
+0.02 +0.023 -0.003 -0.302 Table 2,
7 Strategy
Ronen and
Aharoni
(1989)
-0.026 Table 2, 
Regression 2
Press and 
Winthrop 
(1990)
+0.441 +0.011 -0.008 +0.379 Table 10, 
Case 4
Skinner
(1993)
+0.002 -0.163 +0.041 -0.058 -0.400 -0.255 Table 7, 
Panel C, 
Regression 5
Bowen, 
DuCharme, 
& Shores 
(1995)
+0.248 -0.003 +0.247d-roa Table 4, 
Panel C, 
Year 1993
D_ROA is a dummy variable for the second through ninth rank deciles of industry ROA, and 0 otherwise.
• Debt Hypothesis: The debt hypothesis posits that managers choose income- 
increasing methods to reduce the cost o f debt-covenant violations (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986, 1990). A  relationship between debt-covenants and leverage is 
posited by Watts and Zimmerman (1978), and a positive relationship between leverage 
and the existence o f binding debt covenants is hypothesized by Collins, Rozeff, and 
Dhaliwal (1981); Dhaliwal (1980); and Holthausen (1980) as noted by Zmijewski and 
Hagerman (1981). As shown in Tables 2 through 4, the debt hypothesis is supported 
by empirical evidence in positive coefficients on leverage (or for a debt covenant 
measure after controlling for leverage) for income-increasing methods in Zmijewski 
and Hagerman (1981) (7 strategy); Dhaliwal, Salamon, and Smith (1982) 
(depreciation); Dhaliwal (1988) (depreciation); Niehaus (1989) (depreciation); Lindahl 
(1989) (inventory); Press and Weintrop (1990) (strategy); Cushing and LeClere (1992) 
(inventory); Kuo (1993) (inventory); Skinner (1993) (strategy); and Christie and 
Zimmerman (1994) (depreciation and inventory). Some studies provide inconsistent 
evidence with the debt hypothesis using leverage (Hunt 1985 [inventory]; Lee and 
Hsieh 1985 [inventory]; Caster and Simon 1986 [inventory]; Niehaus 1989 
[inventory]; Knoeber and McKee 1991 [depreciation]; Skinner 1993 [depreciation]; 
and Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores 1995 [depreciation, inventory, and strategy]).
Smith and Warner (1979) propose that interest coverage is a better proxy to 
test the debt hypothesis. A lower (higher) interest coverage ratio is thought to provide 
an incentive to increase (decrease) income. Hunt (1985) (inventory) finds consistent 
evidence for the debt hypothesis using the interest coverage ratio. Inconsistent
15
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
evidence in the form o f insignificant statistical coefficients for interest coverage is 
found by Christie and Zimmerman (1994) (depreciation and inventory).
• Political Cost Hypothesis: The political cost hypothesis is predicated on the 
idea that large firms are more visible to regulators and, hence, are frequently targeted 
for increased taxation. In an attempt to reduce this cost, managers are more likely to 
choose income-decreasing methods as firm size increases (Watts and Zimmerman 
1986, 1990). The Size/political cost hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence in 
negative coefficients for income-increasing methods in Hagerman and Zmijewski 
(1979) (depreciation); Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) (7 strategy); Dhaliwal (1988) 
(depreciation); Ronen and Aharoni (1989) (strategy); Lindahl (1989) (inventory); 
Press and Weintrop (1990) (strategy); Knoeber and McKee (1991) (depreciation); 
Cushing and LeClere (1992) (inventory), Kuo (1993) (inventory); Skinner (1993) 
(depreciation, inventory, and strategy); Christie and Zimmerman (1994) (depreciation 
and inventory); and Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores (1995) (inventory and strategy). 
Some studies provide inconsistent evidence with the Size/political cost hypothesis 
(Hagerman and Zmijewski 1979 [inventory]; Dhaliwal, Salamon, and Smith 1982 
[depreciation]; Lee and Hsieh 1985 [inventory]; and Niehaus 1989 [depreciation and 
inventory]). The inconsistent evidence for the Size/political cost hypothesis is in 
insignificant coefficients (significance greater than 10%) and not from statistically 
significant income-increasing coefficients.
• Accepted Set Hypothesis: Another much less tested hypothesis of positive 
accounting theory is the “accepted set” hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman 1986, 
1990). The accepted set hypothesis holds that managers are limited to a set of
16
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acceptable procedures (e.g., the choices available for inventory) from which to choose 
defined by industry & competitor practices (Watts and Zimmerman 1986, 205). It is 
assumed that the contracting parties jointly determine an accepted set of accounting 
procedures, and the managers of the firm have discretion within the accepted set of 
accounting procedures (Watts and Zimmerman 1990, 136).
Except for the work by Chung, Park, and Ro (1996), little empirical work is 
focused on the cross-industry accepted set theory. Chung, Park, and Ro note that 
firms will often cite industry practice as a reason for choosing an accounting 
procedure. In a study of firms announcing an accounting procedure change, stock 
prices react positively to accounting changes away from common accounting 
procedures and negatively to changes towards common accounting procedures, after 
controlling for the change in income related to the accounting changes. Chung, Park, 
and Ro (1996) provide market-based evidence that the industry consensus accounting 
procedure choice measures the effect o f industry differences on the accepted set of 
accounting procedures. Using the industry consensus accounting procedure choice as 
an explanatory variable allows a direct measure of the industry’s accepted set of 
accounting procedure’s for a firm’s industry.
Knoeber and McKee (1991) also provide market-based evidence of accepted 
sets of accounting procedures as measured in the coefficient of determination of stock 
returns of firms using the same or different sets of accounting procedures. They find a 
statistically significant positive (negative) coefficient on the coefficient of 
determination between stock returns o f a firm using a particular procedure and the 
stock returns of other firms using the same (opposite) procedure.
17
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Some previous studies o f discrete accounting procedure choice have used 
industry dummy variables for various stated reasons. Induistry dummy variables have 
been used to measure the industry effect after controlling fibr other economic variables 
including inflation (Lindahl 1989, 211-2; Lee and Hsieh 1' 985, 475; Niehaus 1985, 
275-6 [publishing industry only]); to indicate measured industry inflation (Niehaus 
1985, 274—5), or used to isolate the political costs of the oiil and gas industry (Bowen, 
DuCharme, and Shores 1995,264).
Lee and Hsieh (1985) (inventory); Niehaus (1989) >(inventory); Lindahl (1989) 
(inventory); and Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores (1995) (depreciation and strategy) 
find statistically significant coefficients for industry dummmy variables. On the other 
hand, Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores (1995) (inventory) d».o not find a significant 
coefficient for the singular industry variable for the oil and . gas industry. Christie and 
Zimmerman (1994) subtract the industry average from alm.ost every independent and 
dependent variable in their study, reasoning that the industnry average represents a 
measure of the efficient accounting procedure choice by inodustry. This suggests that 
using an industry average (i.e., consensus choice) of accepted accounting procedure, 
as an independent variable will measure average efficiency* versus opportunism in this 
sample of subsidiary firms.
Other empirical results also provide evidence for th*.e bonus plan, Size/political 
cost, and debt hypotheses. Christie (1990) reviews a selected set o f the previous 
accounting choice literature. The studies used in Christie’s; analyses use either a
18
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discrete procedure choice or a measure o f continuous choice.2 Christie uses three 
different aggregation techniques in meta-analyses, testing whether the firm 
characteristics used in previous studies have a statistically significant cross-study 
effect on both discrete and continuous measures of accounting choice. Christie finds 
statistically significant cross-study support for the bonus plan, size/political cost, and 
debt hypotheses in the explanatory variables of managerial compensation, leverage, 
size, risk, and interest coverage.
Several competing hypotheses can be found in the literature for the effect of 
risk on accounting method choice. Risk is hypothesized to be negatively associated 
with income-increasing methods due to the political costs o f excessively large 
earnings (Hagerman and Zmijewski 1979, 143; Zmijewski and Hagerman 1981, 132; 
and Press and Weintrop 1990, 82, 86). Christie and Zimmerman (1994, 542, 556) 
reason that increased Risk is positively associated with financial distress, and a firm 
with a higher probability of financial distress is more likely to have made income- 
increasing methods. Skinner (1993, 420) uses Risk as a partial measure of the 
investment opportunity set and does not predict an income incentive for Risk. Both 
Dhaliwal (1988, 291—3) and Kuo (1993, 377) use interactive measures of Risk with 
both leverage and Size. In this construction Risk is hypothesized to complement the 
debt and Size/political cost hypotheses. Lee and Hsieh (1985, 474—5) reason that Risk
2 Continuous measurements o f accounting choices in the literature include 
measures of accruals, “as-if ’ measures of alternative accounting procedures, and 
measures of cash flows.
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from operational volatility increases the cost o f controlling inventory; therefore, Risk 
increases the use o f FIFO to measure inventory cost flow.
Previous research has provided mixed evidence o f the relationship between 
Risk coefficients and income-increasing accounting procedure choices. The following 
results are based on a predicted sign (1-tailed) for the coefficient on Risk. Previous 
studies that find significant negative coefficients on Risk are by Hagerman and 
Zmijewski (1979) (depreciation and inventory) and Lee and Hsieh (1985) (inventory). 
Evidence that the effect of Risk is statistically insignificant is found by Zmijewski and 
Hagerman (1981) (strategy) and Press and Weintrop (1990) (strategy). In addition, 
using either a 1-tailed or 2-tailed significance level, Skinner (1993) (depreciation, 
inventory and strategy) provides results that find Risk to be insignificant. Christie and 
Zimmerman (1994) (depreciation and inventory) find statistically significant positive 
coefficients for Risk. The interaction term between Risk and leverage is found to be 
statistically significant in complementing the effects o f leverage by Dhaliwal (1988) 
(depreciation), but this interaction is found to be insignificant by Kuo (1993) 
(inventory). Both Dhaliwal (1988) (depreciation) and Kuo (1993) (inventory) find 
insignificant coefficients for the interaction of Risk and Size.
Performance is a variable that has been used recently in the discrete accounting 
procedure choice literature to measure the likelihood that a firm chooses income- 
increasing procedures when a firm’s performance decreases (Skinner 1993, 420;
20
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Christie and Zimmerman 1994, 548—9, 556). 3 The incentive to increase measured 
performance by choosing income-increasing procedures is supported by empirical 
evidence in Skinner (1993) (inventory). Some studies provide inconsistent evidence 
with the incentive to increase measured performance by choosing income-increasing 
procedures (in Skinner [1993] [depreciation and strategy], Christie and Zimmerman 
[1994] [depreciation and inventory]). The inconsistent evidence for performance is in 
insignificant coefficients (significance greater than 10%) and not from statistically 
significant income-increasing coefficients.
Skinner (1993) investigates whether including variables for a firm’s investment 
opportunity set will affect evidence for the bonus, size/political cost, and debt 
hypotheses. Even after including the firm-specific investment opportunity set 
variables, Skinner finds statistically significant support for the bonus, Size/political 
cost, and debt hypotheses. Skinner finds that a firm’s investment opportunity set 
variables are also jointly significant in determining accounting procedures for 
depreciation and inventory and for a strategy of procedures in the “full models” o f 
procedure choice.4 Skinner’s study provides statistically significant evidence that a 
firm-specific omitted variables problem for the investment opportunity set have not
3 Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores (1995, 263) use a dummy variable for a 
firm’s measure of performance that is implicitly assumed to be within a range 
normally used in a bonus plan calculation (Healy 1985). ROA falling within the 2-9 
deciles when firm’s performance is ranked by industry are coded 1 and 0 otherwise.
4 Skinner examines multiple models of accounting choice, excluding certain 
variables from the “full model.” For example, first the contractual variables are used, 
then only the noncontractual variables, and then only some of the noncontractual 
variables. The full model has the highest explanatory power as measured by the 
pseudo R-square.
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led to the previous supporting evidence for the bonus plan, size/political cost, and debt 
hypotheses.
The Base Single-Firm Model of Accounting Choice
The base single-firm model for the subsidiary firm’s accounting choice (AC) is 
derived from the positive accounting choice literature discussed above, by starting 
with Skinner’s (1993) model. The single-firm model uses a discrete measure of 
accounting procedure choice. Pincus (1994) concludes that using a discrete model of 
accounting procedure choice results in a sufficient statistic compared to using a 
continuous measure of “as-if’ income (Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores 1995). Studies 
using various measures o f discrete accounting procedure choice have found regression 
results to be robust across differences in the measures o f discrete accounting choice 
(Zmijewski and Hagerman 1981; Skinner 1993; Christie and Zimmerman 1994; and 
Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores 1995). The simplification of measuring accounting 
procedure choice as discrete introduces error in the endogenous variable, which 
increases the standard errors o f the coefficient estimates. The effect o f measuring 
endogenous variables with error is a reduction in the significance of the findings and 
biases against finding significant results (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991; Bowen, 
DuCharme, and Shores 1995). Accounting choice is coded as 1 when it is income 
increasing and 0 when it is income decreasing, which is consistent with Christie and 
Zimmerman (1994).5 The accounting choice literature commonly characterizes
5 Nevertheless, some studies do use a multilevel approach to measuring 
accounting choices.
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straight-line depreciation and longer amortization periods as income-increasing 
methods (Skinner 1993; Christie and Zimmerman 1994), and this approach is 
incorporated in this study. Following Christie and Zimmerman (1994), FIFO and 
weighted-average methods are treated as income-increasing inventory methods. A 
mixture o f income-increasing and income-decreasing methods is treated as income 
decreasing because this choice does not maximize income from accounting choice. 
The single-firm model o f accounting procedure choice is presented below.
AC = / (  SFV) (2.0)
where the single-firm variables (SFV) are identified along with their expected 
coefficients:
SFV =  [Bonus (+), AIP (?), LEV (+), Cover (-), Size (-),
ROA (-), Risk (?), CAP (?), REG (-)] (2.1)
The existing literature provides the basis for the base model o f accounting 
procedure choice. The single-firm model includes the explanatory variables o f bonus 
plan (Bonus), assets-in-place (AIP), leverage (LEV), interest coverage (Cover), Size, 
performance (ROA), Risk, industry consensus accounting procedure (CAP), and 
regulation (REG). Except for the addition o f CAP and REG, this model is similar in
spirit to Skinner’s (1993) full model for depreciation procedure choice. REG is
included because this study includes regulated firms, and the market-based evidence 
of the importance o f the industry consensus choice has been provided by Chung, Park, 
and Ro (1996) since Skinner’s (1993) study. Three variables (research and 
development, Tobin’s  q, and debt covenants) that are not found by Skinner to be 
statistically significant in his full model of depreciation choice have been omitted for
23
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parsimony.6 Assets-in-place is retained from Skinner’s full model o f depreciation to 
proxy for the investment opportunity set. Assets-in-place is used to measure the 
investment opportunity set by Gaver and Gaver (1993), as well as Smith and Watts
(1992).
• Bonus: The first variable in the base SFM is the existence of an accounting 
based bonus plan. Bonus is a dichotomous variable given a value of “ 1” when the 
bonus plan includes accounting income in determining management compensation and 
a value o f “0” when that is not the case.
• Assets-in-place: Assets-in-place (AIP), which is used to proxy for the firm’s 
investment opportunity set according to Skinner’s (1993) model. Skinner (1993, 417) 
discusses the idea that assets-in-place helps define the constrained accepted set of 
accounting methods. It is not clear that assets-in-place will have a predictably 
income-increasing or income-decreasing effect on the accepted set.7 Skinner posits 
that:
6 The ability to separate the effect of debt covenants from the underlying level 
of debt is confounded because of the lack of available information on private debt 
agreements, which are expected to be more important to subsidiary companies than to 
nonsubsidiary firms considering the potential for intercompany lending between a 
parent and subsidiary. Because of the lack of private debt covenant information, 
Skinner uses only public debt covenant information as provided by Moody's when 
coding an indicator variable for the existence of accounting based debt covenants. As 
noted by Skinner (1993, 426), the utilization of private debt by firms is an important 
limitation when using a debt covenant indicator variable if there is a systematic 
relation between a firm’s investment opportunity set and a firm’s mix of public versus 
private debt.
7 Watts and Zimmerman (1986, 1990) posit that the contracting parties in the 
firm agree to an accepted set of alternative accounting policies and the accepted set 
constrains the accounting methods available to the manager o f the firm.
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firms with relatively more assets-in-place are more likely to use 
eamings-based bonus plans, so that managers of these firms have larger 
incentives to make income-increasing accounting choices ex post, it 
may also be that these firms’ accepted sets of accounting procedures 
are more likely to restrict managers’ ability to make these choices ex 
ante. (1993, 417)
Skinner (1993, 433) reasons that more assets-in-place (the inverse o f growth 
opportunities) results in a lower variability o f inventory levels, and that ex ante 
reduces the probability of LIFO layer liquidations which increases the probable use of 
the LIFO (income decreasing) inventory procedure. This study should provide 
additional evidence on what role that assets-in-place play in a subsidiary firm’s 
accounting choice, specifically whether the assets-in-place ex post income-increasing 
effect or the ex ante income-decreasing accepted set effect dominates for subsidiary 
firms. Assets-in-place is measured as the previous four-year average o f total book 
value of assets less the book value of intangible assets divided by Size.
• Leverage: Leverage is defined as the previous four-year average o f the book 
value of long-term debt divided by the book value of total assets, consistent with 
Skinner (1993). The coefficient on leverage is expected to be positive for choosing 
income-increasing accounting procedures.
• Interest Coverage: Interest coverage (Cover) a measure of the firm’s 
performance toward satisfying the demands of debt investors to fulfill debt covenants 
(Christie 1990). The coefficient on interest coverage is expected to be negative for 
choosing income-increasing accounting procedures. Interest coverage is measured by 
the previous four-year average of interest expense divided by operating income before 
depreciation.
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• Size: Firm Size (Size) is associated with the political cost hypothesis. The
political cost hypothesis for a single-firm organization holds that as Size increases, the
chance o f regulation increases. Therefore, Size is predicted to be negatively
associated with income-increasing policies in an effort to stave off regulation (Watts
and Zimmerman 1986, 1990). However, as Watts and Zimmerman note:
The evidence is consistent with the political cost hypothesis. However, 
the result only appears to hold for the largest firms (Zmijewski and 
Hagerman, 1981) and is driven by the oil and gas industry 
(Zimmerman, 1983). (1990, 140)
What Size proxies for is not completely understood. Size possibly proxies for 
multiple influences in accounting choice, as noted by Watts and Zimmerman (1986, 
1990) and Ball and Foster (1982). The coefficient on Size is expected to be negative 
for choosing income-increasing accounting procedures. Size is measured by the 
previous four-year average of the sum of the market value of equity plus the book 
value o f debt, consistent with Skinner (1993).
• Performance: Performance (ROA) is measured by the previous four-year 
average o f a firm’s return on assets. The coefficient on performance (ROA) is 
expected to be negative. There is potential, though, for the parent managers to acquire 
(at a cost) a more familiar level of information than is available to outside investors, 
thus mitigating the income-increasing incentive for subsidiary managers.
• Industry consensus accounting procedure: Chung, Park, and Ro (1996) 
document that firms routinely state that conformity with the industry consensus choice 
is the reason for making accounting choice decisions. Christie and Zimmerman 
(1994) reason that the industry consensus proxies for the efficient choice on average 
for an industry and is used in the calculation of the dependent variable. An industry
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consensus accounting policy (CAP) may represent an efficient choice for the majority 
o f firms within an industry and help identify the accepted set o f accounting choices for 
a particular firm in that industry. Previous literature, as noted earlier, has provided 
evidence that generally supports the idea that there is an industry effect associated 
with accounting procedure choice after controlling for firm characteristics.
The industry consensus accounting procedure, CAP, is measured as “ 1” when, 
after deleting each firm from its industry, at least 60% of the firm’s three-digit SIC 
group industry uses income increasing accounting choices, “-1” when 60% or more 
industry firms use income-decreasing methods and “0” otherwise. This specification 
of an industry consensus accounting policy is defined is the same as that used by 
Chung, Park, and Ro (1996).
Applying the reasoning o f Christie and Zimmerman (1994), that the industry 
index represents an efficient choice, allows an interpretation of the coefficient on 
CAP. A positive coefficient on an efficient CAP implies that the sample firms choose 
their procedures based more on efficiency than opportunism. A negative coefficient 
on an efficient CAP implies that the sample firms choose their procedures based more 
on opportunism than efficiency.
• Risk: Political cost considerations lead to an expected negative coefficient 
for increasing risk levels when choosing income-decreasing procedures, and financial- 
distress pressures lead to an expected positive coefficient for increasing risk levels 
when choosing income-decreasing procedures. This leads to an ambiguous prediction 
for the sign of the coefficient for risk in the single-firm model. Risk is measured as
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the previous four-year standard deviation o f monthly returns divided by the maximum 
standard for the sample firms included in the regressions o f each accounting choice.
• Regulation: Based on the political cost hypothesis, Regulation is associated 
with an incentive to use income-decreasing accounting procedures. This study uses a 
dummy variable coded as “ 1” for firms in regulated industries and coded “0” 
otherwise. A number o f previous studies have omitted firms in regulated industries 
and this dummy variable is employed to control for the effect o f being in a regulated 
industry. The expected coefficient on regulation is negative due to the political cost 
hypothesis. Regulated industries are coded “ 1” when the SIC group is within the 
groups 4000 to 4999 (e.g., railroads, trucking, communications, utilities, and air 
transport).
Tax Considerations for Inventory
Two additional variables will be considered for the inventory method choice. 
Tax-loss carryforwards (TLC) will be added to the model for choices dealing with 
inventory. Tax-loss carryforwards are expected to be associated with income- 
increasing inventory methods. TLC is measured as a “ 1” if  there is a tax-loss 
carryforward and “0” otherwise. In addition, input price indices (INFL) will be 
included in the inventory model to control for inventory cost flows. Ceteris paribus, 
LIFO is expected to be used to delay tax payments when input prices are increasing. 
INFL is measured as “ I” if the average inflation is 3% or more for the previous five 
years, “-1” if the average deflation is 3% or more for previous five years, and “0” 
otherwise.
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Contract Provisions in the Organization
Like accounting choices, contractual provisions in the organization are 
endogenous (Watts and Zimmerman 1990, 137). Including contract provisions 
introduces endogeneity, which would be better analyzed in a model o f structural 
equations. Unfortunately, as Skinner (1993) notes, a current lack o f understanding of 
these complex relationships prevents this approach. The subject of endogeneity, and 
whether to use a structural-equations approach, is beyond the scope o f this study. 
Therefore, like Skinner’s (1993) study, a bonus contract variable (Bonus) is included 
in alternative models in this study. The existence of accounting-based bonus plans are 
coded as “ 1” and “0” otherwise. As noted above in the base single-firm model 
section, Skinner does not find statistical significance for the debt-constraint variable 
for depreciation; and therefore, this contractual variable is not included in this study.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES, DATA, AND METHODS 
The Research Hypotheses: Multi-Firm Considerations
This study is designed to examine if the single-firm model o f accounting 
choice derived from previous accounting choice literature is adequate to explain the 
accounting procedure choice o f subsidiary firms in multi-firm organizations. The 
primary null hypothesis o f this study is:
HI: Multi-firm characteristics do not jointly add statistically significant 
explanatory power to the regression o f the determinants o f accounting 
procedure choice in the subsidiary.
The base model of accounting procedure choice is expected to be inadequate 
because the dynamics of the parent-subsidiary relationship are not considered. The 
salient aspects of the parent-subsidiary relationship that are hypothesized to influence 
the subsidiary accounting choice are as follows: (1) the influence of the economic 
reasons that lead the parent manager to select the parent firm’s accounting choice, (2) 
the effect o f intercompany contracting costs and the vertical or horizontal business 
integration between the parent and subsidiary (including the cost of the parent 
manager understanding the subsidiary’s business), and (3) the level o f ownership that 
the parent holds in the subsidiary. The multi-firm variables (MFV) and the expected 
signs of the coefficients included in the multi-firm model of the subsidiary’s 
accounting procedure choice are summarized below.
MFV = [PAC (?), MAG (?), INDSPEC (?),
INDSIM (?), %0wn (?)] (3.1)
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Multi-firm Organization Considerations
• PAC: One possible scenario in a multi-firm organization is that, ceteris
paribus, the subsidiary’s accounting choice will be influenced by the parent’s
accounting choice (PAC). The managers of the parent entity may wish to align the
accounting methods of the subsidiary to the parent to ensure the uniform effect for
accounting-based compensation plans and debt covenants. While a parent manager
has incentive to make choices that are efficient for the entire multi-firm organization, a
subsidiary manager’s incentives can be more localized for a variety of reasons
including job tenure and firm specific contractual incentives. Separate firms are used
to create efficient contracting arrangements within the multi-firm organization, while
simultaneously helping to define efficient contracting arrangements with outside
parties. Watts and Zimmerman speak o f organizational considerations in terms of
contracts and organizational structure:
Since the 1970s, economists have strived to develop a theory of the 
firm by attempting to explain the organization structure of the firm 
(e.g., choice of corporate form, structure of contracts, management 
compensation, centralization-decentralization). (1990, 133)
This reasoning is consistent with Watts and Zimmerman’s (1990, 137) 
argument that there are accepted sets of accounting methods for each firm. For 
example, the accepted set for depreciation might include the accelerated methods of 
declining balance and sum-of-the-years digits, but not include the straight-line 
method. The accepted sets of accounting choices for two firms can overlap, as 
illustrated by Watts and Zimmerman (1990, 137). At the limit, a subsidiary’s accepted 
set o f accounting methods can be restricted to the parent’s selected method.
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There is no ex ante predictable income-effect for the parent’s accounting 
choice’s influence on the subsidiary’s accepted set o f accounting methods. I f  the 
parent’s accounting procedure were efficient, then a positive coefficient on the 
parent’s accounting choice would signify that on average the subsidiary uses an 
accounting procedure that is efficient for the parent o f the multi-firm organization. A 
negative coefficient on the parent’s accounting choice would signify that on average, 
the subsidiary uses an accounting procedure that is not efficient for the parent o f the 
multi-firm organization. The above discussion leads to the following null hypothesis.
H2: The parent choice is not significant to the subsidiary accounting choice.
• MAG: Another multi-firm variable to be investigated is the measure o f the 
magnitude (MAG) of organization-wide control costs for decisions made for the 
subsidiary: “The extent to which accounting choice affects the contracting parties’ 
wealth depends on the relative magnitudes of the contracting costs” (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1990, 135). When the potential magnitude of the contracting costs 
associated the subsidiary is high, the parent managers have incentive to monitor and 
control the subsidiary’s accounting choice. The MAG for the depreciation choice is 
measured as the subsidiary firm’s income reduced by depreciation divided by the same 
income measure of the parent. The MAG for the inventory choice is measured as the 
subsidiary firm’s income adjusted for LIFO reserves divided by the same income 
measure o f the parent.
• ENDSIM, INDSPEC: Two industry specific variables address the concern 
that there are alternative decision makers for the subsidiary’s accounting choice in the 
multi-firm organization. The parent manager with a subsidiary must decide who can
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efficiently make the accounting choice for the subsidiary. To make this decision, the 
parent manager considers the differences in knowledge possessed by the parent 
manager and the subsidiary manager, the cost of effectively transferring knowledge to 
either potential decision maker, and the expected contracting cost of delegating 
decisions to the subsidiary manager. The relevant costs of centralization and 
decentralization are expected to be affected by whether the parent and subsidiary are 
in the same industry (INDSIM) and whether or not the subsidiary’s industry uses 
specialized knowledge (INDSPEC).
These two variables are expected to help measure the effect of business 
integration factors on the selection o f the accounting policy decision maker (parent or 
subsidiary manager), but because no measure of centralization (identity of the decision 
maker) is included in the model used in this study, the expected effect o f these two 
variables on the subsidiary’s accounting choice is ambiguous. The identity of the 
decision maker (measure of centralization) is not included in the subsidiary’s 
accounting choice model because the decision maker is not known. The discovery or 
identification o f the actual decision maker for the subsidiary is beyond the scope of 
this study, but the possibility o f alternative decision makers may be a significant issue; 
therefore, variables to control for this issue are included in the model of subsidiary 
accounting choice.
According to Jensen and Meckling (1992) and Christie, Joye, and Watts 
(1998), the firm’s value is maximized by choosing the decision maker to minimize the 
sum of the knowledge-transfer costs in bringing the relevant knowledge to the 
decision maker and the contracting (control) costs o f the decision maker. Jensen and
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Meckling (1992) present a theoretical framework for allocating decision rights 
(allocating who has authority to make decisions within the organization). In an 
empirical paper, Christie, Joye, and Watts (1998) find the expected associations 
between the variables INDSIM and INDSPEC and the level o f authority granted to the 
subunit manager. Christie, Joye, and Watts use a survey that produces sample sizes 
from 93 to 121 where the dependent variable (level of operating authority granted to 
the subunit manager) and the level o f operating linkages between the higher level unit 
and the subunit are known and revealed by the firms surveyed. In one of Christie, 
Joye, and Watts’s alternative models, the revealed operating linkages are successfully 
proxied by INDSIM.
Christie, Joye, and Watts constructed a classification system to identify ex ante 
which industries use specialized knowledge, which is costly to transfer to another 
firm’s manager (the measure of INDSPEC). The results o f  Christie, Joye, and Watts’s 
(1998) analyses is that the level of operating authority granted to the subunit manager 
is predictably associated with the variables that are hypothesized to determine the 
authority of the decision maker at the lower-level unit (INDSIM and INDSPEC). 
Therefore, including the variables INDSIM and INDSPEC in the model of accounting 
choice addresses the need of intemal-control variables noted in the accounting choice 
literature and uses variables that have been shown empirically to be predictably related 
to the level of operating authority granted to subunit managers.
Vertical or horizontal integration between the parent and subsidiary will 
increase the likelihood that the parent manager has incentives to exercise control over 
the subsidiary. When the parent and the subsidiary firm are in the same industry and
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therefore potentially integrated either horizontally or vertically or when the subsidiary 
has operations that are relatively costless to understand, the parent is more likely to 
have incentives to control the subsidiary's accounting choice than when they are not 
integrated firms.
The remainder o f this subsection is a more detailed analysis of the relevant cost 
trade-offs and their affect on centralization and decentralization as described by 
Christie, Joye, and Watts (1998) and Jensen and Meckling (1992). The two cost 
behaviors that are discussed are knowledge-transfer costs and control costs. Control 
costs o f uncoordinated decisions by the subsidiary managers include the cost of 
monitoring the subsidiary manager decisions. As the cost to transfer knowledge to the 
parent increases, the cost to monitor the subsidiary manager increases. In other words, 
control costs increase with knowledge-transfer costs. This means that while 
knowledge-transfer costs decrease centralization directly, knowledge-transfer costs 
increase centralization indirectly by increasing control costs related to the monitoring 
of the subsidiary manager. Therefore, there is no predictable effect on the 
centralization or decentralization of decision-making when knowledge-transfer costs 
are increasing. To control for the direct and indirect effects of knowledge-transfer 
costs in this study, the specialized knowledge variable INDSPEC is included, which 
corresponds with Christie, Joye, and Watts’s (1998, 28) ex ante estimation of 
industries by level of knowledge specialization within each industry and is used to 
code the variable INDSPEC. The industry knowledge-specialization coding ranges 
from 0 to 1. For example, insurance industry knowledge is coded as 0. Insurance is a 
business of large numbers, which is knowledge that is easily transferred, but
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manufacturing is coded a 1, where operations can be very complex and the knowledge 
is rather specialized.
When centralization occurs, the knowledge flows primarily from the subsidiary 
toward the parent to make decisions. Alternatively, when decentralization occurs, 
knowledge flows from the parent to the subsidiary. Information flows to the 
subsidiaries when knowledge aggregation at the parent level is useful for the 
subsidiary’s decision making. A possible downward information flow implies that 
knowledge-transfer costs can be negative when the value added by aggregating 
knowledge at the parent level outweighs the cost of transferring the knowledge 
(Christie, Joye, and Watts 1998). Knowledge of trends in product demand and the 
optimal utilization o f recourses in similar subsidiaries are examples. This value in 
aggregating knowledge can be especially valuable when the parent uses subsidiary 
firms to increase scale by replicating operating units. Certain types of knowledge (i.e., 
numerical or statistical) are expected to be relatively costless to transfer, while 
“specialized” knowledge types are more costly to transfer. For instance, multi-firm 
organizations that rely on networks for distribution o f goods or services generate large 
amounts o f statistical information related to their operations that can be easily 
aggregated at the parent level, and in these situations, there is value added by the 
aggregation of the unit’s statistics.
On the other hand, a subsidiary with specialized operations will generate 
knowledge that is costly to transfer because the subsidiary managers are most familiar 
with the specialization of their own operations. For example, manufacturing 
operations that employ complicated cost allocations are characterized by specialized
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operations. In accounting terms, depreciation is a cost that may be allocated in rather 
fine ways within a manufacturing operation but is unlikely to have complex cost 
allocations in the insurance industry. The existence o f specialized knowledge that is 
costly to transfer increases decentralized decision-making; therefore, ceteris paribus, a 
local manager who is more familiar with the operations has a competitive advantage 
over the parent managers in determining efficient accounting methods (Jensen and 
Meckling 1992; Skinner 1993; Christie, Joye, and Watts 1998).
In this paper the term control costs, is used to identify the specific contracting 
costs o f delegating decision making in this paper, and is consistent with Christie, Joye, 
and Watts (1998). Control costs occur when there are uncoordinated decisions at the 
subsidiary firm level. The cost of coordination increases when two firms have 
operations with operating linkages between them. In other words, control costs from 
uncoordinated decisions exist when there are operating linkages between the 
subsidiary and the parent. In this study, it is assumed that INDSIM reflects operating 
linkages. Whenever the parent and subsidiary are integrated either vertically or 
horizontally, there are externalities between the parent and the subsidiary. Operating 
linkages between the subsidiary and the parent are measured in the variable INDSIM 
and are coded as 1 if the parent’s and subsidiary’s lines of business fall within the 
same two-digit SIC group as the parent’s and 0 otherwise, which is consistent with the 
public information measure o f operating linkages used by Christie, Joye, and Watts 
(1998). Mian and Smith (1990a) also use a measure of operating linkages between the 
parent and the subsidiary firm in a model of the parent’s choice o f consolidation 
reporting.
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• Risk: Risk is a variable already included in the single-firm model as noted 
above, but Risk in a multi-firm environment is discussed here following the reasoning 
presented by Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999). As noted above, the previous 
literature leads to an ambiguous sign o f the Risk coefficient for the use o f income- 
increasing procedures in a single-firm model of accounting choice. They address the 
process of contracting delegated authority and specify the common determinant of 
Risk in both the informed boss’s willingness to delegate and the subordinate’s (firm 
manager) willingness to engage in opportunistic actions in repeated-game equilibrium 
when there is an uninformed boss. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999) conclude that 
the Risk (implied by the discount rate) of the future extreme outcomes affects both the 
boss’s and subordinate’s actions. Specifically, they conclude that the likelihood of the 
informed boss retaining authority from the subordinate increases with the Risk of 
extremely good or bad outcomes. On the other hand, with an uninformed boss, the 
subordinate is less willing to take actions that will result in the acceptance of 
substandard projects that hurt the boss when the discount rate (Risk) is low because 
the subordinate’s reputation is at risk and, therefore, the subordinate risks future cash 
flow by taking actions that result in the acceptance of poor projects. Using an 
opportunistic accounting procedure over an efficient one corresponds to taking actions 
that lead to the acceptance of poor projects when project performance is measured in 
terms o f accounting numbers. Opportunistic accounting procedures could be choosing 
income-increasing methods, while increasing income might be an efficient way to 
manage the financial stress of debt covenant compliance. Following Baker, Gibbons, 
and Murphy, and after controlling for the level of knowledge of the parent manager,
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an increasing level o f Risk implies that (1) ex ante, the accepted set o f  accounting 
policies is more likely to be restricted by the parent manager, and that (2) firm 
managers are more likely to choose accounting procedures that hurt the parent 
manager ex post o f the contracting process. Not knowing the parent manager’s 
preference for the accounting choice for the subsidiary leads to an ambiguous ‘multi­
firm’ prediction for the variable Risk. The ambiguous nature of Risk in the multi-firm 
model only intensifies the single-firm ambiguous association of Risk and income- 
increasing methods.
• %Own: The level of ownership (%Own) that one firm has in another firm is 
used by the FASB to measure the level of apparent control. Ownership above 50% 
normally indicates that control exists over another firm. When the parent owns more 
than 50%, then control over decisions is feasible but not certain. Some decisions are 
delegated to the subsidiary managers; and therefore, parent firms owning more than 
50% do not exercise control over certain decisions. This begs the question of whether 
an indicator variable identifying a 51% or greater level of ownership is significant to 
the subsidiary’s accounting choice. The idea is that there is some level o f parental 
ownership that, on average, signals an exercise o f influence over the subsidiary’s 
accounting policies. There is also an income incentive related to increasing 
concentrations o f outside ownership according to Niehaus (1989). Niehaus (1989, 
270) reasons that “as the concentration of outside ownership increases, these outsiders 
have greater incentive to monitor managers,” which leads to the idea that, ceteris 
paribus, increased parental ownership is negatively associated with income increasing 
accounting methods. Proportional ownership is measured as a 1 when the parent owns
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51% and 0 otherwise. Sensitivity tests will be performed to estimate the appropriate 
level o f ownership that on average signals an exercise o f control or influence over the 
subsidiary’s accounting policies. APB 18 defines that holding 20% or more o f the 
voting stock leads to the presumption that the investor is able to exercise significant 
influence over the investee, but this presumption does not indicate the level of 
ownership that on average reflects an exercise of influence over a subsidiary’s 
accounting policy. The arguments relating to proportional ownership levels lead to the 
following null hypothesis.
H3: Parental ownership levels are not negatively significant to income- 
increasing accounting procedures at the subsidiary level.
In summary the multi-firm characteristics along with their expected 
coefficients regarding income-increasing accounting procedures are: PAC (?), MAG 
(?), INDSPEC (?), INDSIM (?), %Own (-).
Rescission Option for Decision M aking A uthority 
One fact o f organizational control is that delegated accounting policy decision 
rights may be rescinded unless the subsidiary managers contractually commit to the 
use o f an accounting policy with an outside party such as a debt holder. A rescission of 
decision rights occurs if  the actual control costs are higher than originally expected or 
knowledge-transfer costs from the subsidiary to the parent decrease sufficiently. The 
rescission of decision rights are consistent with Watts and Zimmerman’s (1986, 1990) 
theory of accepted sets o f discretionary accounting policies within firms of the 
organization. In other words, when subsidiary managers select accounting choices 
outside of the accepted set for the multi-firm organization, parent managers have the
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option to veto a decision or rescind the right o f subsidiary managers to make the 
decision. The ability to centralize previously delegated decisions implies that parent 
managers will rescind decision-making authority when the control costs are estimated 
to exceed the upper bound of knowledge-transfer costs.8
There are multi-period considerations to consider when contemplating the 
rescission of delegated authority. The contractual control costs o f nonoptimal 
subsidiary manager decisions are period specific. The cost o f transferring knowledge 
to the parent when rescinding decision rights is a single-period expenditure that is 
assumed to be constant over time. Another assumption is that decision-right 
rescissions are executed only when efficient. Because future contractual control costs 
o f delegated authority are bounded by the parent manager’s rescission option, ceteris 
paribus, the ability to rescind decision-making authority increases decentralization.
Internal Capital Markets
Internal capital markets may play a role in determining accounting choices for 
subsidiary firms. Internal capital markets are systems of capital allocation within an 
organization. Whether internal capital markets efficiently allocate investment funds 
within the organization is unclear. Some authors have noted that internal capital 
markets can serve the objective o f picking the relatively best projects available in the 
organization (Williamson 1975, Stein 1997). On the other hand, some authors argue 
that internal capital markets can serve to inefficiently fund inferior projects (Jensen 
1986, Stulz 1990, Billett and Mauer 1998) or serve to deny adequate funding to
8 This assumes that the partial derivative of control costs to knowledge-transfer 
costs is less than unity when knowledge-transfer costs are upwardly positive.
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superior projects (Wulf 1999). Regardless, any incentive to increase investment gives 
the subsidiary firm manager an incentive to choose income-increasing accounting 
policies. For accounting policies to be important for capital expenditure approvals, the - 
approval of funding projects must depend, in part, on accounting numbers. In other 
words, either future cash flows must be dependent on accounting choices (e.g., 
inventory choice), or projected cash flows must be estimated with accounting numbers 
in order for the accounting numbers to be relevant to capital funding decisions (e.g., 
depreciation can be used to estimate maintenance costs). Ceteris paribus, a subsidiary 
manager may have more incentives than a parent manager to choose income- 
increasing accounting methods due to the effect of the internal capital markets.
Sample Design
The sample o f parents and subsidiaries in this study comes from Securities 
Data Corporation’s (SDC) databases. Subsidiary firms are identified when the level of 
ownership exceeds 20%. For accounting purposes, firms that are owned at least 20% 
by the parent are generally accounted for by using the equity method, while firms that 
are owned at least 50% are consolidated. The time period of the study is from 1978 to 
1997, but because variable definitions are for four-year average values, the first 
observations start in 1982. The distribution of the final sample by year is detailed in 
Table 5.
The sample’s industry distribution is presented in Table 6. Accounting 
choices, accounting numbers, and other items used in the models are taken from
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Table 5
Distribution of Sample Firms by Year
Year Number
of
Sample
Observations
1982 2
1985 2
1986 1
1987 7
1988 8
1989 2
1990 8
1991 9
1992 8
1993 5
1994 11
1995 11
1996 14
1997 12
Total 100
Standard and Poor’s 1997 Compustat PC Plus and the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) databases. The distribution o f accounting choices in the sample is 
detailed in Table 7. Contractual compensation variables are collected from proxy 
statements. Both acquisition and divestiture dates are used to examine choices when 
the parent has control over the subsidiaries.
The final sample contains one hundred observations o f which ninety-six 
observations are used in the depreciation models and thirty-six are used in the 
inventory models. Summary statistics for the variables are presented in Table 8.
Table 9 presents the correlation coefficients between regressors. There is no pair of 
regressors with a correlation coefficient higher than |p|>0.59, except between the 
Regulation and interaction term of parent choice and Regulation, which is only
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Table 6
Distribution of Subsidiary Firms and Their Respective Parents by Industry
Industry
Description
SIC codes Number
of
Parent
Firms*
Number of 
Subsidiary 
Firms
1990 
Population 
of Firms
Agriculture Production 100 0 1 14
Gold and Silver Ores 1040 1 3 75
Crude Petroleum and 1311 2 4 218
Natural Gas 
Oil and Gas Field 1381-1389 0 2 43
Services
Construction 1531-1731 3 1 79
Food Products 2000-2086 2 3 128
Fabric Mills 2211-2250 1 1 36
Millwork 2430 1 0 10
Paper Products 2621-2670 2 0 65
Printing 2711-2780 5 4 93
Chemicals 2800-2890 7 6 327
Plastics 3080-3089 1 1 61
Footwear 3140 1 0 17
Glass 3220 0 1 3
Cement 3241 0 1 6
Primary Metals 3310-3334 3 2 72
Fabricated Metals 3440-3490 1 1 102
Construction and Oil and 3531-3533 3 I 26
Gas Equipment 
Industrial Fans 3564 0 1 18
Computer Equipment 3570-3577 3 4 147
Office Equipment 3578-3579 0 1 20
Industrial Equipment 3590 1 I 13
Electrical Equipment 3600-3679 5 10 392
Aircraft Engines 3724 1 0 10
Guided Missiles 3760 1 0 4
Measuring Instruments 3822-3861 7 8 321
Misc. Manufacturing 3911-3990 4 2 62
Railroads 4011 3 0 27
Trucking 4213 0 1 32
Air Transport 4512 1 1 32
Communication 4812-4899 9 6 160
Utilities 4911-4991 4 4 272
Lumber — Whls. 5031 1 0 3
Computers -  Whls. 5045 1 0 25
Hardware — Whls. 5072 1 0 7
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Table 6 Continued
Industry
Description
Sic codes Number
of
Parent
Firms*
Number of 
Subsidiary 
Firms
1990
Population 
of Firms
Durable Goods — Whls. 5090 0 1 11
Jewelry — Whls. 5094 1 1 2
Paper Products — Whls. 5110 0 1 7
Whls. Chem. & Pretro. — 
Whls.
5160-5172 2 0 75
Misc Nondurable Goods — 
Whls.
5190 0 1 6
Bldg Material - Retail 5200 1 1 5
Department Stores 5311 1 0 25
Variety Stores 5331 2 0 23
Apparel and Accessory 
Stores
5600 0 1 7
Women's Clothing Stores 5621 1 0 18
Eating Places 5812 0 2 92
Misc Shopping Goods 
Stores
5940 0 1 12
Jewelry Stores 5944 0 I 9
Catalog, Mail-Order 
Houses
5961 2 I 15
Investments and Insurance 6021-6799 7 5 893
Services and Misc. 7200-9995 8 12 799
Totals 100 100 4,927
* Includes repeats of 14 parent firms. Whls. = Wholesale.
included in an alternative model. Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lutkepohl, and Lee (1988, 
868) note than a common rule of thumb for a serious multicollinearity problem 
between regressors is a correlation coefficient greater than 0.80. Therefore, it appears 
that multicollinearity has not seriously degraded the regressions of subsidiary 
accounting choice.
To be included in the final sample, the data for all regressor and dependent 
variables had to be nonmissing. The original sample from SDC included 644
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Table 7
Distribution of Accounting Choices of Subsidiary and Parent Sample Firms
Accounting Methods Coding
Subsidiary
Firms
Parent
Firms
Depreciation:
Accelerated Methods 0 1 3
Combined Accelerated and 0 18 20
Straight-line methods 
Straight-line Method 1 77 73
Totals 96 96
Inventory:
LIFO 0 4 6
Standard Cost 0 2 2
Specific Identification 0 1 0
Average Cost 1 6 10
FIFO 1 23 18
Totals 36 36
acquisitions and 813 divestitures over the period 1978 to 1997. The data that proved 
to be limiting factors are the parent’s accounting choice and the parent’s return data 
used to measure Risk. In the end eighteen firms are eliminated when these items are 
missing. In addition, four observations were eliminated because the bonus plan 
information is missing for the parent. Observations with duplicate parents are 
eliminated, which affected fifteen observations. Only the most recent parent 
observation is used. Seven observations are eliminated because the parent does not 
report a depreciation method in the period o f observation. Another ten observations 
are excluded because of missing interest coverage data, acquisitions and 813 
divestitures over the period 1978 to 1997.
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Table 8
Univariate Statistics of Subsidiary Firm  Variables and Their Respective Parent 
Company Variables
Variable N Mean Std Dev M inimum Maximum
Sub DEP Method 96 0.802 0.401 0.000 1.000
Sub INV Method 36 0.806 0.401 0.000 1.000
Par DEP Method 96 0.760 0.429 0.000 1.000
Par INV Method 36 0.778 0.422 0.000 1.000
Sub Bonus 100 0.600 0.492 0.000 1.000
Sub Assets in Place 100 1.513 2.935 0.165 18.762
Sub Leverage 100 0.214 0.158 0.005 0.986
Sub Interest Coverage 100 147.832 960.955 -549.272 9,492.619
Sub Size 100 5.858 1.604 2.637 10.139
Sub ROA 100 -0.504 15.508 -81.211 33.702
Sub Volatility 100 0.249 0.133 0.094 1.000
Sub Regulation 100 0.120 0.327 0.000 1.000
Sub Tax Loss Carry 36 0.222 0.422 0.000 1.000
Sub Inflation 36 0.111 0.398 - 1.000 1.000
Sub Industry 100 0.780 0.629 - 1.000 1.000
Sub Control Costs 100 1.775 7.026 0.000 61.540
Sub Industry
Specialization 100 0.720 0.451 0.000 1.000
Sub/Par Industry
Similarity 100 0.600 0.492 0.000 1.000
Proportional
Ownership 100 0.569 0.236 0.200 0.900
Previously Owned 100 0.030 0.171 0.000 1.000
Par Choice/Reg
Interaction 100 0.100 0.302 0.000 1.000
Par Bonus 100 0.500 0.503 0.000 1.000
Par Assets in Place 100 7.267 42.755 0.070 358.384
Par Leverage 100 0.237 0.139 0.000 0.625
Par Interest Coverage 100 11.576 28.003 -19.462 241.058
Par Size 100 7.559 2.144 2.661 11.352
Par ROA 100 1.065 8.429 -37.529 19.112
Par Volatility 100 0.324 0.158 0.116 1.000
Par Regulation 100 0.160 0.368 0.000 1.000
Par Tax Loss Carry 36 0.361 0.487 0.000 1.000
Par Inflation 36 0.194 0.401 0.000 1.000
Par Industry CAP 100 0.670 0.551 - 1.000 1.000
N= Number of observations, Sub = Subsidiary, Par = Parent, INV = Inventory, 
DEP = Depreciation, CAP = Industry consensus accounting procedure 
Par Choice/Reg Inter. = PAC x REG, ROA = Return on Assets.
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Table 9
Correlation of Independent Variables Used in the Subsidiary Regression Models
Variable 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Bonus -.07 -.25 -.08 -.00 .12 -.00 .05 -.12 -.06 -.04
2 AIP .01 -.02 -.32 -.14 -.05 -.09 -.07 .01 .15
3 LEV .22 .03 -.11 -.17 .32 .13 .49 -.01
4 Cover .13 .05 -.09 .28 -.12 .05 .04
5 Size .34 -.12 .15 -.34 -.03 -.28
6 ROA -10 .07 .01 -.13 -.22
7 Risk -.15 .03 -.02 .13
8 REG .08 .43 .06
9 TLCF .02 X
10 INFL X
Variable 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 Bonus -.02 .10 -.01 -.05 -.13 -.02 -.10 -.13 .00
2 AIP .10 .12 .06 .03 .01 .05 -.02 -.10 -.08
3 LEV .09 -.03 -.03 -.26 .06 -.03 .10 .28 .33
4 Cover -.33 .05 .01 -.19 -10 -.02 .55 .09 .28
5 Size -.10 -.24 -.11 -.04 .08 .07 .01 -.09 .10
6 ROA .25 -.25 .10 -.15 .06 .16 -.01 -.14 .04
7 Risk .00 -.10 .05 .23 .04 -.06 -.09 .20 -.12
8 REG .16 .13 .08 .59 .20 .02 .12 -.01 .90
9 TLCF -.29 .21 .34 -.12 -.15 .01 .00 .19 .16
10 INFL .15 -.09 -.08 -.30 -.08 -.01 .00 .16 .24
11 PDEP pc .12 -.11 -.09 -.23 .05 .10 -.04 .19
12 PINV -.02 .12 -.18 -.26 .30 .00 -.09 .13
13 CAP .08 -.22 -.22 -.20 .06 .12 .12
14 MAG .09 -.06 .11 -.03 -.07 -.07
15 INDSPC .08 .11 -.02 .04 -.53
16 INDSIM -.13 .02 .10 -.27
17 %Own -.03 -.63 .00
18 PREV .24 .14
19 ACQUIR .03
20 PACREG
x = independent variables are only used in the inventory models and are not used in 
the depreciation models.
pc = parent choices are not used together in the same models.
PDEP = parent depreciation choice, PINY = parent inventory choice.
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Model Specification
The models in this study consist o f the single-firm model and the multi-firm 
model. The multi-firm model is the single-firm model with the addition o f the multi­
firm variables discussed in the hypotheses development section. The single-firm and 
multi-firm models are presented below. The single-firm model is repeated from 
above.
AC —f  (SFV) (2.0)
where
SFV = [AIP (?), LEV (+), Cover (-), Size (-),
ROA (-), Risk (?), CAP (?), REG (-)] (2.1)
AC = / (SFV, MFV) (3.0)
where the multi-firm variables (MFV) are identified along with their expected 
coefficients:
MFV = [PAC (?), MAG (?), INDSPEC (?),
INDSIM (?), %Own (-)] (3.1)
As discussed in the hypothesis development section, (HI), the primary 
research hypotheses is whether multi-firm characteristics jointly add statistically 
significant explanatory power to the regression of the determinants o f the subsidiary’s 
accounting procedure choice. Therefore, the significance of the multi-firm variables 
will be examined via a chi-square test where the null hypothesis is that all o f the multi­
firm coefficients are equal to 0. A logit model will be used to analyze the accounting 
procedure choice models. The evaluation of comparative models follows Skinner
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(1993) who uses pseudo R-square to identify the model with the highest explanatory 
power. Maddala (1983) points out that the assumptions underlying ordinary least 
squares are violated when using a dichotomous model. Maddala (1983) also explains 
that if the explanatory variables are jointly normal, then the OLS t- and F-tests are 
exact, but in this study, like many others, the use o f  binary explanatory variables 
prevents the explanatory variables from being jointly normal.
This study follows the majority of discrete accounting choice studies that use a 
statistical model specifically designed to accommodate the use o f discrete dependent 
variables. Either probit or logit models are used in the following discrete accounting 
procedure choice studies: Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979), Zmijewski and 
Hagerman (1981), Dhaliwal, Salamon, and Smith (1982), Hunt (1985), Lee and Hsieh 
(1985) Caster and Simon (1986), Dhaliwal (1988), Niehaus (1989), Knoeber and 
McKee (1991), Cushing and LeClere (1992), Kuo (1993), and Skinner (1993). Judge, 
Hill, Griffiths, Lutkepohl, and Lee (1988, 788) note, “The choice between the probit 
and logit models is usually made on the basis of convenience.” Other studies use OLS 
(Christie and Zimmerman 1994; and Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores 1995). Lindahl 
(1989) uses a quadratic hill climbing statistical procedure in his model. Some studies 
have performed both OLS and logit (Hagerman and Zmijewski 1979 and Christie and 
Zimmerman 1994); however, determining the differences of using OLS versus a 
discrete statistical model is beyond the scope of this study.
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL TEST RESULTS
Table 10 presents the base single-firm depreciation models for the parent and 
subsidiary firms. Models 10.1 and 10.2 are for the parents and subsidiaries 
respectively. Interestingly, for the subsidiary firms in Model 10.2, the pseudo R- 
square of 21.5% is higher than that for the parent firms at 11.7% in Model 10.1. The 
fact that the single-firm model for the subsidiary firms provides more predictive power 
than it does for the parent firms makes it, ex ante, more difficult to find additional 
explanatory power for the multi-firm variables in the expanded multi-firm models of 
depreciation choice.
The logit score for the subsidiary Model 10.2 is 0.2%, which rejects the null 
hypothesis that the regressor variables are jointly equal to 0. In the subsidiary Model
10.2, the coefficient on performance (ROA) is significantly negative (p=8.1%). The 
coefficient on industry consensus accounting procedure is also significantly positive 
(p=l .9%, 2-tailed). In the parent model, the coefficient on Size is significantly 
negative (p=3.4%), and the coefficient on CAP is significantly positive (p=4.5%, 2- 
tailed) while the coefficient on Bonus is significantly negative (p=9.2%). If this set of 
parent firms operates primarily through subsidiary firms, then the significantly 
negative Bonus coefficient may be explained by the low hurdles normally set for 
achieving bonus payouts in profit centers in multilayer organizations (Merchant and 
Manzoni 1989).
Tables 11 presents the multi-firm model results for depreciation choice in the 
subsidiary firms. Models 11.1 to 11.5 are identical in construction except for their
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Table 10
Single-firm Logit Model of Parent and Subsidiary Firms' Depreciation Choice
Dependent variable is the depreciation choice o f the firm.
Data are coefficients with p-values in parentheses. Number o f observations = 96.
Model Number
10.1
Parent
10.2
Subsidiary
Intercept (?) 3.414 0.482
(0.074) (0.836)
Bonus (+) -0.744 -0.593
(0.092) (0.195)
AIP (?) 0.038 0.095
(0.718) (0.617)
LEV (+) -0.441 -2.971
(0.420) (0.102)
Cover (-) 0.035 0.000
(0.135) (0.360)
Size (-) -0.290 -0.005
(0.034) (0.491)
ROA (-) -0.034 -0.055
(0.188) (0.081)
Risk (?) -2.356 3.650
(0.296) (0.368)
CAP (?) 1.178 1.403
(0.045) (0.019)
REG (-) 0.914 0.499
(0.149) (0.306)
Logit Score 0.218 0.002
Goodness of Fit 0.200 0.740
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.221
Table 1 presents the variable definitions. The logit score is a 
chi-square test of the null hypothesis that all regressor variables 
except the intercept are jointly zero. The Goodness-of-fit statistic is a test 
of the null hypothesis that the model is well specified.
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measures o f %Own. The level of pseudo R-square is used to choose the best model 
for explaining the subsidiary’s depreciation choice. Using various measures of %Own 
helps to answer the question “What is the level o f ownership that on average reflects 
an exercise o f influence over a subsidiary’s accounting policy?” Just because a parent 
is able to exercise control over a subsidiary’s decision does not mean that the parent 
exercises the control. APB 18 states that holding 20% or more o f the voting stock 
leads to the presumption that the investor is able to exercise significant influence over 
the investee unless there is significant evidence to the contrary.
Ownership levels in the sample vary from 20% to 90%. The cutoff levels 
selected to measure %Own in Models 11.1 to 11.5 are a continuous measure, a cutoff 
at 50%, 40%, 30%, and 25%. In the base multi-firm model for depreciation (Model 
11.2), the cutoff of 40% provides the highest pseudo R-square among the various 
measures of %Own in Models 11.1 to 11.5. In Models 11.1 to 11.5 %Own is 
significant (p=1.4%) when measured at the 40% cutoff. %Own is also significant at 
the 30% cutoff (p=4.5%), but the 40% cutoff in Model 11.2 gives the highest pseudo 
R-square.
Next is a discussion of the empirical results for the base multi-firm model with 
the 40% %Own found in Model 11.2. In Model 11.2 the chi-square test o f the null 
hypothesis that the multi-firm variables are jointly equal to 0 is rejected (p=3.2%).
The coefficient on leverage is significantly negative (p=9.0%). The negative 
coefficient for leverage may result from the effects of interfirm financing 
arrangements between corporations in a multi-firm organization.
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Table 11
M ulti-firm Logit Model of Subsidiary Firm s' Depreciation Choice
Dependent variable is the depreciation choice o f the subsidiary firm. 
Data is t-statistic with p-values in parentheses. Number o f observations
Model N um ber
11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5
Intercept (?) -1.633 -2.294 -1.318 -0.396 -1.094
(0.614) (0.512) (0.692) (0.904) (0.730)
Bonus (+) -0.764 -0.690 -0.74 -0.850 -0.695
(0.174) (0.208) (0.185) (0.156) (0.197)
AIP (?) 0.095 0.101 0.084 0.078 0.08
(0.603) (0.578) (0.640) (0.678) (0.654)
LEV (+) -4.110 -3.658 -3.952 -3.716 -3.964
(0.072) (0.090) (0.071) (0.082) (0.072)
Cover (-) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.241) (0.257) (0.270) (0.301) (0.262)
Size (-) 0.394 0.461 0.401 0.301 0.353
(0.107) (0.083) (0.105) (0.157) (0.128)
ROA (-) -0.0774 -0.059 -0.059 -0.055 -0.066
(0.083) (0.134) (0.127) (0.140) (0.106)
Risk (?) 7.784 10.030 8.495 6.456 6.885
(0.167) (0.120) (0.152) (0.218) (0.206)
CAP (?) 1.342 1.399 1.445 1.485 1.398
(0.059) (0.052) (0.040) (0.032) (0.050)
REG (-) -1.476 -1.443 -1.864 -1.249 -1.465
(0.174) (0.179) (0.125) (0.214) (0.176)
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Table 11 Continued
Model Number
11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5
PAC (?) 2.360 2.939 2.612 2.265 2.352
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
MAG (?) -0.018 -0.027 -0.021 -0.020 -0.017
(0.657) (0.501) (0.601) (0.609) (0.671)
INDSPEC (?) -1.642 -1.258 -1.801 -1.759 -1.67
(0.198) (0.339) (0.180) (0.169) (0.190)
INDSIM (?) -0.061 0.094 0.192 0.019 0.019
(0.940) (0.909) (0.812) (0.981) (0.981)
0.5 0.4 0.3 0.25 c
%OWN * (-) -1.002 -2.393 -1.778 -1.226 -1.497
(0.115) (0.014) (0.045) (0.188) (0.195)
MFV Test 0.058 0.032 0.042 0.068 0.069
Logit Score 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
Fit 0.964 0.681 0.898 0.611 0.968
Pseudo R2 0.330 0.365 0.345 0.326 0.325
Table 1 presents the variable definitions. MFV Test is a chi-square test of the 
null hypothesis that the multi-firm coefficients are jointly equal to zero. The logit 
score is a chi-square test o f the null hypothesis that all regressor variables except 
the intercept are zero. Fit =The Goodness-of-fit statistic which is a test o f the null 
hypothesis that the model is well specified. * The subperscript text above the 
%OWN coeffeicents are the levels of cuttoff, and C indicates that the %Own is 
measured continuously.
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The coefficient Size is significantly negative (p=8.3). The coefficient on the 
industry consensus accounting procedure is significantly positive (p=5.2%, 2-tailed). 
The coefficient on the parent’s accounting choice is significantly positive (p=0.1%, 2- 
tailed). As discussed above, %Own is significantly negative (p=l.4%, 2-tailed).
Three sensitivity tests on the depreciation sample are performed. First, an 
indicator variable indicating if another firm previously owned (PREV) the subsidiary 
before being acquired by the current parent firm. Some o f the acquired firms in the 
sample were acquired from other companies; and to control for the residual effect of 
previous ownership the dummy variable PREV is used. For subsidiary acquisitions, 
all firms that were owned by another parent at the time o f acquisition are identified by 
SDC. Those subsidiaries that are owned less than 51% (after the acquisition by the 
current parent) are deleted to avoid the confounding issue of the current parent not 
being the true parent firm. Subsidiaries that were owned by a previous parent (before 
acquisition o f the current parent) and are now owned at least 51% by the current 
parent have the variable PREV and are coded as I, and 0 otherwise. The same set of 
measures for %Own used in Models 11.1 to 11.5 are used again in Models 12.1 to 
12.5, along with the addition of the PREV variable. As in Models 11.1 to 11.5, %Own 
measured at 40% again provides the results with the highest pseudo R-square at 37.9% 
in Model 12.2.
In Model 12.2 (with PREV) the chi-square test o f the null hypothesis that the 
multi-firm variables are jointly equal to 0 is rejected (p=3.6%). The coefficient on 
leverage is significantly negative (p=7.0%). The negative coefficient for leverage may 
result from the effects o f interfirm financing arrangements between corporations in a
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Table 12
Multi-firm Logit Model of Subsidiary Firms* Depreciation Choice
Dependent variable is the depreciation choice of the subsidiary firm.
Data is t-statistic with p-values in parentheses. Number of observations = 96.
Model Number
12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.8 12.9 12.10 12.11
Intercept (?) -1.084 -1.939 -0.946 -0.208 -0.665 -0.974 0.842 0.185 -0.313 -0.473 0.701
(0.746) (0.596) (0.785) (0.952) (0.842) (0.777) (0.829) (0.960) (0.934) (0.895) (0.858)
Bonus (+) -0.809 -0.737 -0.77 -0.855 -0.758 -0.836 -1.229 -0.915 -0.8340 -0.778 -1.214
(0.165) (0.197) (0.179) (0.157) (0.182) (0.164) (0.099) (0.143) (0.170) (0.179) (0.102)
AIP (?) 0.060 0.080 0.059 0.049 0.053 0.060 0.031 0.041 0.050 0.052 0.027
(0.766) (0.694) (0.766) (0.814) (0.789) (0.766) (0.871) (0.835) (0.811) (0.792) (0.886)
LEV (+) -5.010 -4.416 -4.795 -4.763 -4.962 -4.934 -4.022 -4.498 -4.818 -4.867 -4.287
(0.055) (0.070) (0.056) (0.061) (0.054) (0.062) (0.120) (0.075) (0.065) (0.063) (0.113)
Cover (-) 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
(0.285) (0.273) (0.297) (0.328) (0.298) (0.288) (0.355) (0.332) (0.328) (0.304) (0.291)
Size (-) 0.290 0.392 0.324 0.229 0.279 0.2890 0.366 0.297 0.226 0.279 0.394
(0.187) (0.129) (0.166) (0.237) (0.195) (0.186) (0.142) (0.183) (0.237) (0.194) (0.129)
ROA (-) -0.084 -0.068 -0.070 -0.068 -0.077 -0.086 -0.088 -0.072 -0.068 -0.078 -0.093
(0.089) (0.127) (0.121) (0.131) (0.102) (0.091) (0.120) (0.126) (0.130) (0.103) (0.113)
Risk (?) 6.259 9.113 7.440 5.273 5.966 6.392 11.640 7.879 5.266 6.086 11.866
(0.282) (0.176) (0.230) (0.332) (0.300) (0.278) (0.110) (0.198) (0.334) (0.294) (0.116)
CAP (?) 1.544 1.550 1.601 1.653 1.567 1.544 1.850 1.687 1.646 1.568 1.837
(0.040) (0.039) (0.030) (0.024) (0.037) (0.040) (0.030) (0.027) (0.025) (0.038) (0.029)
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Table 12 Continued
Model Number
12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.8 12.9 12.10 12.11
REG (-) -1.281 -1.434 -1.753 -1.107 -1.323 -1.301 -2.014 -2.072 -1.108 -1.360 -4.552
(0.215) (0.186) (0.148) (0.247) (0.210) (0.213) (0.131) (0.125) (0.247) (0.207) (0.148)
PAC (?) 2.622 3.191 2.893 2.574 2.677 2.612 3.599 2.884 2.583 2.673 3.436
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
MAG (?) -0.020 -0.029 -0.023 -0.021 -0.019 -0.020 -0.041 -0.024 -0.021 -0.019 -0.049
(0.621) (0.482) (0.577) (0.589) (0.638) (0.619) (0.331) (0.545) (0.592) (0.641) (0.325)
INDSPEC (?) -1.494 -1.122 -1.624 -1.566 -1.525 -1.507 -1.722 -1.914 -1.557 -1.548 -1.776
(0.253) (0.409) (0.238) (0.231) (0.246) (0.253) (0.268) (0.208) (0.236) (0.246) (0.249)
INDS1M (?) 0.303 0.374 0.494 0.37 0.342 0.29 0.404 0.549 0.373 0.332 0.480
(0.736) (0.674) (0.576) (0.676) (0.700) (0.747) (0.658) (0.534) (0.674) (0.709) (0.610)
0.5 0.4 0.3 0.25 c 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,25 c 0.4
%OWN (-) -0.684 -2.249 -1.625 -0.86 -1.371 -0.778 -4.431 -2.249 -0.802 -1.601 -4.358
(0.213) (0.020) (0.062) (0.269) (0.224) (0.241) (0.005) (0.048) (0.312) (0.253) (0.005)
PREV (?) -2.854 -2.641 -2.871 -3.064 -3.196 -2.71 -0.768 -2.199 -3.120 -3.085 -0.734
(0.120) (0.130) (0.103) (0.089) (0.068) (0.198) (0.695) (0.257) (0.114) (0.106) (0.706)
AQUIR (?) -0.149 -2.719 -0.915 0.069 -0.167 -2.694
(0.893) (0.061) (0.420) (0.945) (0.885) (0.058)
PACREG (?) 2.901
(0.510)
MFV Test 0.061 0.036 0.044 0.065 0.064 0.101 0.075 0.079 0.105 0.106 0.128
Logit Score 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Fit 0.968 0.775 0.946 0.923 0.962 0.966 0.590 0.688 0.922 0.996 0.191
Pseudo R2 0.347 0.379 0.362 0.345 0.346 0.347 0.404 0.366 0.345 0.346 0.407
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Table 12 Continued
Table 1 presents the variable definitions. MFV Test is a chi-square test of the null hypothesis that the multi-firm 
coefficients are jointly equal to zero. The logit score is a chi-square test of the null hypothesis that all regressor 
variables except the intercept are zero. Fit =The Goodness-of-fit statistic which is a test of the null hypothesis that 
the model is well specified. * The subperscript text above the %OWN coeffeicents are the levels of cuttoff, 
and C indicates that the %Own is measured continuously.
VO
multi-firm organization. The coefficient on the industry consensus accounting 
procedure is significantly positive (p=3.0%, 2-tailed). The coefficient on the parent’s 
accounting choice is significantly positive (p=0.1%, 2-tailed). As discussed above, 
%Own is significantly negative (p=4.0%, 2-tailed).
The second sensitivity test involves the indicator variable AQUIR, which 
indicates that the subsidiary was partially acquired as opposed to being partially 
divested by the parent. The same set of measures for %Own used in Models 12.1 to 
12.5 are used again in Models 12.6 to 12.10, along with the addition of the AQUIR 
variable. As in Models 12.1 to 12.5, %Own measured at 40% again provides the 
results with the highest pseudo R-square at 40.4% in Model 12.7. The results in 
Model 12.7 with the AQUIR variable are very similar to those in Model 12.2 except 
that the coefficient on AQUIR is significantly negative (p=6.I%, 2-tailed).
The third sensitivity test in Model 12.11 is to take Model 12.7 and include an 
interaction term between the parent’s accounting choice and the regulation variables. 
The results of including this interaction term are insignificant and, therefore, this 
model is rejected for parsimony. The parent’s accounting choice remains significant 
and the Regulation variable remains insignificant compared to Model 12.7.
Table 13 presents the single-firm inventory of choice models for the parent and 
subsidiary firms. Due to the fairly small sample of inventory firms, several variables 
were deleted to prevent quasi or complete separations in the sample including the 
Bonus variable for both the parent’s and subsidiary’s samples, and the parent’s 
accounting choice for the subsidiary sample, the industry consensus accounting
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Table 13
Single-Firm Logit Model o f Parent and Subsidiary Firms' Inventory Choice
Dependent variable is the inventory choice o f the firm.
Data is t-statistic with p-values in parentheses. Number of observations = 36.
 Model Number
13L1 13^2
Parent Subsidiary
Intercept (?) 6.864 6.080
(0.173) (0.270)
AIP (?) -0.644 0.485
(0.503) (0.784)
LEV (+) 4.362 -2.424
(0.224) (0.252)
Cover (-) 0.088 -0.002
(0.193) (0.283)
Size (-) -0.724 -0.884
(0.021) (0.093)
ROA (-) -0.016 0.052
(0.428) (0.216)
Risk (?) -1.534 1.977
(0.720) (0.600)
CAP (?) -0.715
(0.236)
REG (-) 0.384
(0.346)
TLC (+) 0.479 -2.882
(0.698) (0.055)
Infl. (+) 0.099
(0.465)
Logit Score 0.699 0.524
Goodness of Fit 0.156 0.781
Pseudo R2 0.194 0.196
Variables with missing statistics result from the variable being ommitted due to 
quasi or complete seperation in the sample. Table 1 presents the variable definitions 
The logit score is a chi-square test o f the null hypothesis that all regressor variables 
except the intercept are zero. The Goodness-of-fit statistic is a test o f the null 
hypothesis that the model is well specified.
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procedure choice for the parent firms, regulation for the subsidiary firms and inflation 
for the subsidiary firms.
In the single-firm inventory choice analysis for the subsidiary firms in Model
13.2, Size is significantly negative for the subsidiary firms (p=9.3%). Tax-Ioss 
carryforwards are significantly negative (p=5.5%), which may result from subsidiaries 
being in a consolidated return group where the tax effects in multiple firms are 
aggregated together. Model 13.1 provides the single-firm results for the parent firms. 
Size is significantly negative (p=2.1%). The pseudo R-square for the parent and 
subsidiary models are 19.4% and 19.6% respectively.
Table 14 contains the results o f the multi-firm model for inventory choice. As 
is done for the depreciation sample, various levels of parental ownership levels are 
used in Models 14.1 to 14.5. For the multi-firm models of inventory choice, the level 
of proportional ownership that gives the highest pseudo R-square of 28.0% is 
measured at 30% in Model 14.3. In Model 14.3, the coefficient on Size is 
significantly negative (p=7.1%), the coefficient on industry consensus accounting 
procedure is significantly negative (p=9.1%), and the coefficient on tax-loss 
carryforwards is significantly negative (p=2.5%). The negative coefficient on Tax- 
loss carryforwards may result from the subsidiaries being part of consolidated tax 
return groups. The coefficient on proportional ownership is significantly negative 
(p=5.7%). The multi-firm chi-square test is calculated on the single multi-firm 
variable proportional ownership because other multi-firm variables are deleted when 
they introduce sample separation problems. The multi-firm chi-square test of the null
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Table 14
Multi-firm logit model of the subsidiary firms' inventory choice
Dependent variable is the inventory choice of the subsidiary firm.
Data are coefficients with p-values in parentheses. Number of observations = 36.
o \u>
Model Number
14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7
Intercept
AIP
LEV
Cover
Size
ROA
Risk
CAP
TLC
(?)
(?)
(+)
(-)
(-)
(-)
(?)
(?)
(+)
6.095
(0.261)
0.409
(0.817)
-2.431
(0.249)
- 0.002
(0.272)
-0.889
(0.091)
0.051
(0.217)
2.446
(0.544)
-0.749
(0 .222)
-2.908
(0.027)
7.685
(0.165)
0.425
(0.787)
-3.785
(0.153)
-0.003
(0.164)
-1.037
(0.066)
0.062
(0.167)
3.370
(0.424)
-1.044
(0.140)
-3.026
(0.033)
8.041
(0.156)
0.481
(0.774)
-4.268
(0.138)
- 0.002
(0.250)
- 1.000
(0.071)
0.059
(0.194)
4.373
(0.332)
-1.504
(0.091)
-3.654
(0.025)
16.755
(0.968)
0.682
(0.719)
-2.389
(0.255)
- 0.002
(0.246)
-0.836
(0.105)
0.064
(0.161)
2.194
(0.562)
-0.604
(0.543)
-2.817
(0.030)
8.236
(0.155)
0.236
(0 .886)
- 2.688
(0.223)
- 0.002
(0.228)
-1.019
(0.071)
0.056
(0.189)
3.461
(0.406)
-0.968
(0.159)
-3.194
(0.023)
38.167
(0.044)
0.552
(0.788)
-6.338
(0.162)
-0.028
(0.030)
-4.447
-0.105
(0.205)
17.805
(0.125)
-7.598
(0.023)
-7.453
(0.032)
18.703
(0.125)
0.755
(0.715)
-2.889
(0.265)
-0.005
(0.090)
-2.187
(0.057)
-0.028
(0.416)
6.845
(0.270)
-4.091
(0.146)
-4.895
(0.042)
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Table 14 Continued
Model Number
14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7
0.5 0.4 0.3 0.25 c 0.4 0,3
%OWN * (-) -0.374 -1.798 -3.060 -11.228 -3.354 -17.013 -8.106
(0.372) (0. 082) (0.057) (0.489) (0.112) (0.026) (0.059)
PREV (?) -16.767 -6.920
(0.050) (0.156)
MFV Test 0.743 0.163 0.113 0.978 0.224 0.146 0.292
Logit Score 0.619 0.477 0.319 0.600 0.508 0.372 0.211
Goodness of Fit 0.406 0.412 0.762 0.853 0.374 0.598 0.501
Pseudo R2 0.199 0.245 0.280 0.210 0.232 0.441 0.374
Table 1 presents the variable definitions. MFV Test is a chi-square test of the 
null hypothesis that the multi-firm coefficients are jointly equal to zero.
The logit score is a chi-square test of the null hypothesis that all regressor 
variables except the intercept are zero. The Goodness-of-fit statistic is a test 
of the null hypothesis that model is well specified.
* The subperscript text above the %OWN coeffeicents are the levels of cuttoff. 
For example, 0.5 indicates that the %OWN is measured as 1 when 
proportional ownership is greater than 50%. The superscript C indicates 
that the %OWN is measured continuously.
hypothesis that the one multi-firm variable is equal to 0 is a “two-sided” test, and 
therefore, it is not appropriate when the single multi-firm variable has a predicted sign.
Models 14.6 and 14.7 provide the results when the variable for previous 
ownership (PREV) is added to the multi-firm model when proportional ownership 
levels are measured at 40% and 30% respectively. O f these two models, Model 14.6 
with %Own measured at 40% gives the highest pseudo R-square of 44.1%. Other 
results from Model 14.6 are that interest coverage is significantly negative (p=3.0%), 
Size is significantly negative (p=1.9%), the industry consensus accounting procedure 
is significantly negative (p=2.3%), tax-loss carryforward is significantly negative 
(p=3.2%), proportional ownership is significantly negative (p=5.3%), and previous 
ownership is significantly negative (p=50%). In Model 14.6, the logit test is a chi- 
square test that does not reject the null hypothesis that all model coefficients are 
jointly equal to 0 (p=37.2%). The chi-square multi-variable test that all multi-firm 
variables are jointly equal to 0 is not rejected at normal levels of statistical 
significance (p=14.6%). A sensitivity test for the interaction term between the parents 
accounting choice and the regulation variable is not included because use of this 
variable causes sample separation problems.
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study examines the depreciation and inventory accounting choices made 
by partially owned subsidiaries in multi-firm organizations. Previous accounting 
choice studies focus on the parent company's choice. Examining the subsidiary’s 
choice is important because subsidiaries can contribute significantly to the financial 
results o f a multi-firm organization. Furthermore, understanding the accounting 
choices of partially owned firms should be of interest to the subsidiary's 
noncontrolling equity interest owners, as well as regulators and educators.
The analysis is conducted using a sample o f partially owned subsidiaries (i.e., 
more than 20%, but less than 100% owned) between 1978 and 1997 for which 
separate financial statements are available. Accounting choices of both the subsidiary 
and parent firms are examined using a single-firm model o f accounting choice derived 
from the previous literature. The single-firm model of accounting choice provides 
more explanatory power for subsidiary firms than it does for parent firms in this 
sample. The subsidiary firm choices are then examined with a multi-firm model of 
accounting choice that extends the single-firm model with variables that measure the 
parent-subsidiary relationship. A chi-square test of the multi-firm variables rejects the 
null hypothesis that the multi-firm variables are jointly equal to zero. Various levels 
of parental ownership are tested to identify the average level o f parental ownership 
that influences the subsidiary’s accounting choice for depreciation (40%) and 
inventory (30% or 40%). The findings for depreciation and inventory choice are
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similar but certain regressor variables are eliminated in the inventory models to 
prevent sample separation problems that would result in unstable regression results.
The implications o f  the study are (1) A model of accounting choice that 
excludes the parent-subsidiary relationship is not adequate for subsidiary firms, (2) On 
average, parental influence over accounting choice is exercised when ownership levels 
reach 40% for depreciation and 30%-40% for inventory, (3) The parent's accounting 
choice is not sufficient by itself to explain the subsidiary's accounting choice, and (4) 
The industry consensus accounting procedure (Chung, Park, and Ro 1996) is 
important in determining the accounting choice o f  subsidiary and parent firms.
Limitations o f the study are (1) The inferences may not be applicable to wholly 
owned subsidiary firms, (2) The smaller sample size for inventory choice requires the 
omission of some variables to prevent sample separation problems, and (3) The 
endogeneity o f the subsidiary firm's choice in the parent firm's choice is not examined.
There are several ways to extend this work. For example, I plan on using a 
structural equation approach to address the endogeneity issue in the multi-firm 
environment. My current ongoing research includes a study of subsidiary and parent 
auditor choices in the multi-firm organization. Another extension o f this work is a 
study of continuous measures of accounting choice (accruals and "what if ' numbers) 
in the multi-firm environment. Another potential extension is to investigate subsidiary 
accounting method changes in the multi-firm environment.
To conclude, the accounting choice of partially owned subsidiary firms is 
significantly dependent upon variables that measure the multi-firm environment, and 
neither the parent's choice nor the single-firm model of accounting choice is adequate
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to explain the subsidiary’s accounting choice. This study of subsidiary accounting 
choice provides a preliminary basis for understanding accounting choices in multi­
firm organizations.
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